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from their advantageous observation post, a more just and uniform
result will surely follow."
H. V. McC.

DUE PROCESS

CLAUSE-DOUBLE

JEOPARDY-CRUEL

AND

UN-

USUAL PUNISHMENT-SECOND ELECTROCUTION AFTER FAILURE OF
FIRST

ATTEMPT.-The petitioner, Willie Francis, a Negro citizen of

the State of Louisiana, was tried and convicted of murder in September, 1945, and sentenced to death by electrocution. The prisoner
was placed in the electric chair of that state on May 3, 1946. The
The switch was thrown but, apparently because of a mechanical defect, death did not result. Petitioner was returned to prison. A new
death warrant was issued. Applications for relief were filed in the
Supreme Court of Louisiana. The petitioner claimed that the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment' protects him against
double jeopardy and cruel and unusual punishment as prohibited by
the Fifth 2 and Eighth 3 Amendments of the Federal Constitution.
The court denied the application on the ground of lack of any basis
for judicial relief. Held, the due process clause does protect a man
against double jeopardy and cruel and unusual punishment by state
action. However, a second execution after a failure of the first attempt is not double jeopardy or cruel and unusual punishment within
the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment. The cruelty must be
inherent in the method of punishment and double jeopardy involves
a retrial after a valid acquittal. Louisiana v. Resweber, 329 U. S.
459, 91 L. ed. 422 (1947).
The court in reaching the conclusion, stated above, had three
questions of Constitutional Law to determine. It was necessary to
interpret the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution. It first discussed the Fourteenth Amendment to
determine if, through it, the Fifth and Eighth Amendments were
binding upon the states.
Prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment there were
no specific restrictions upon the states concerning the internal governing and administration of criminal justice. The broad terms of
Article IV of the Constitution applied only to relations between
states. The restrictions and limitations found in the first ten amendments apply only to federal action. The Fourteenth Amendment,
7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2056 (3d ed. 1940).
1U. S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, 1, ". . . Nor shall any state deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ..."
"See

2 U. S. CONST. AMEND. V, ". ..

Nor shall any person be subject for the

same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ... "
3U. S. CONST. AMEND. VIII, ". . . Excessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted."
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though written in broad and inexplicit terms, placing no specific
restrictions upon the state, does provide "No state shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
the citizens of the United States." It was believed by many that
this clause was a "catch all" phrase and that it would have the effect
of reverting back and including the first ten amendments within the
privileges and immunities which a state could not deny a citizen. It
was urged that a citizen of the United States enjoyed the protection
of the first ten amendments against federal action and the Fourteenth
Amendment was intended to extend the field of such protection to
prohibit a state from denying a citizen a privilege he already enjoyed.
This view was rejected by the Supreme Court.4 The court in interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment has decided that it has a function independent of the first ten amendments. It places upon the
states the duty of adhering to a code of conduct, or standard of
natural justice fundamental in our concept of ordered society. This
standard neither contains each provision of the first ten amendments,
nor is it limited in its scope to these amendments.5 The privileges
and immunities guaranteed are the basic fundamental rights of free
men. The Bill of Rights 6 is fundamental in our concept of justice
and is therefore considered in creating this standard. By this construction the due process clause does not remove from the states the
right to enforce their own conception of fairness unless it is in violation of this standard. Mr. Justice Cardozo stated in Snyder v.
MassachUSetts7 11. .unless in so doing it offends some principle of
justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to
be ranked as fundamental. . . ." It would be.in violation of these
principles if in the principal case the petitioner was subjected to cruel
and unusual punishment, or double jeopardy, for such punishment
or jeopardy would be contrary to the standard of justice established
by due process. However, the majority of the court felt that the
petitioner was not so subjected.
The prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment has its
origin in an Act of Parliament in 1688. The act was designed to
abolish punishments of torture and unnecessary cruelty inflicted at
the time for certain crimes. This concept of humane punishment for
crimes is a part of our people's conception of natural justice and
civilized standards. Our minds rebel against the infliction of torture,
inhuman or barbarous punishment. The founders of our nation made
such a prohibition expressly binding upon Congress and the federal
courts through the Eighth Amendment. The due process clause has
extended this protection to state action. Since cruel and unusual

4Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 24 L. ed. 616 (1877).
r Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 82 L. ed. 288 (1937).
6U. S. CoNsT. AMENDS. I to X inclusive.

7291 U. S.97, 78 L. ed. 674 (1934).
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punishment would be in violation of due process, the next question
to be determined is, would a second electrocution after a failure of
the first attempt be cruel and unusual punishment?
The subject of cruel punishment was considered by the New
York Court of Appeals in People ex rel. Kemnrler v. Durston8 where
the petitioner challenged the state's right to change the mode of execution. The court stated ". . The infliction of the death penalty in
any manner must necessarily be accompanied with what might be
considered in this age, some degree of cruelty, and it is deemed
necessary for the protection of society." In upholding the statute
the court stressed the fact that the new mode of execution, electrocution, caused instantaneous and painless death and was more humane
than the previous method of death by hanging. The case was taken
to the Supreme Court of the United States on writ of error. 9 The
court in affirming the New York decision stated "Punishments are
cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel within the meaning of the word as used
in the Constitution. It implies something inhuman and barbarous,
something more than the mere extinguishment of life." Cruel and
unusual punishment must involve cruelty inherent in the method of
punishment.
The real question to be determined is, would it be cruelty inherent in the method of execution to once again compel the prisoner
to undergo the mental strain of preparation for execution? It is not
questioned that any type of lingering death would be cruelty and in
violation of due process. The law concerns itself only with physical
punishment and the only punishment imposed upon the petitioner is
death. The principle does not protect against the necessary mental
suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life
humanely. An unforseeable accident cannot add the element of
cruelty to this otherwise permissible method of execution. The death
itself will not be lingering, but instantaneous, it is this with which
the law is concerned. The second execution would not be cruel and
unusual punishment.
The third question to be answered is, would the second electrocution subject the petitioner to double jeopardy? The restriction
against double jeopardy is basic in our concept of justice and a violation of the doctrine would be a violation of due process. The prohibition against double jeopardy was found in the common law of
England and was considered so fundamental to early Americans that
the prohibition was included in the Federal Constitution and in the
New York State Constitution.' ° In establishing an accurate concept
of what constitutes double jeopardy, the common law, which forms

119 N. Y. 569, 24 N. E. 6 (1890).
0In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, 34 L. ed. 519 (1890).
'ON. Y. CoNsT. Art. 1, § 6.
s
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its basis, must be considered. Common law protection from second
jeopardy for the same offense insures a prisoner against a second
prosecution after a court, having jurisdiction, had acquitted him of
the offense. The second jeopardy is not against the peril of second
judgment but against being again tried for the same offense. It is
well settled that the double jeopardy clause applies only to a second
prosecution, after a valid acquittal, not to a new trial after nppeal.11
Thus when the accused successfully seeks review of a conviction upon
a new trial there is no double jeopardy for the first trial is a nullity.
The court in Kepner v. United States 12 restated the common law
doctrine of double jeopardy in arriving at the federal rule. The court
stated its interpretation as follows:

".

. . The prohibition is not

against being twice punished, but against being tvice put in jeopardy;
and the accused, whether convicted or acquitted, is equally put in
jeopardy at the first trial. An acquittal before a court having no
jurisdiction is, of course, like all the proceedings in the case, absolutely void, and therefore no bar to subsequent indictment and trial
in a court which has jurisdiction .... ,, 13 The New York courts in
interpreting Article I, Section 6, of the New York Constitution have
reached the same conclusion as the federal courts. The question of
double jeopardy came before the Court of Appeals early in the de-4
velopment. of our constitutional interpretation in Ratzky v. People,1
in which the petitioner challenged the state's right to resentence after
an improper judgment. The prisoner had been tried under the provisions of the Criminal Code of 1860 and sentenced under the Code
of 1862. The court determined that resentencing the prisoner was
not in violation of the double jeopardy clause of the New York State
Constitution. A person is subjected to double jeopardy only when
he is a second time tried on a criminal accusation, after a previous
trial, legal and regular in form. The provision does not apply to a
resentence after an erroneous judgment, and the Court of Appeals
on reversal will remit the record, with directions to pronounce the
appropriate sentence. 15 As we have seen from the Puthorities the
double jeopardy clause of both the Federal and New York State
Constitution applies only to a retrial after a valid, binding, errorless
conviction or acquittal. It has no application in the principal case.
It would seem that the federal and New York courts have arrived
at the same conclusions in interpreting the cruel and unusual punishment and double jeopardy clauses in their respective Constitutions.
The principal case, therefore, though it would be one of first impression, would in all probability be followed in New York.
R. J. McD.
llKepner v. United States, 195 U. S. 100, 49 L. ed. 114 (1904).
12195 U. S. 100, 49 L. ed. 114 (1904).
.3 Id. at 129, 49 L. ed. at 124.
1429

N. Y. 124 (1864).

15 People v. McKee, 32 N. Y. 239 (1865).

